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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The long-term effects of the recession will likely depress employment and 
incomes in Hispanic communities at least through the end of 2004, and 
judging from historical experience that time span will be longer than for any 
other major population group. Even if predictions of a turnaround later this 
summer prove valid, pocketbook issues will vex Latinos for several years after 
the national economy recovers. 
Second-generation Latinos—U.S.-born children of an immigrant parent—
are now experiencing high job losses. In recent recessions Hispanic 
unemployment has fallen hardest on low-skilled immigrants. This time, young 
people who are the products of U.S. schools are experiencing the highest 
unemployment rates among Latinos. Many work in skilled occupations, 
including managers, technicians and professionals, and many are in the early 
years of household formation. Prolonged joblessness could prove a historic 
setback for them, their communities and the nation.  
These are among the key findings from a research project conducted by the 
Pew Hispanic Center to assess the recession’s impact on the Latino population. 
The project report examines job losses for Hispanics in the recession thus far 
and forecasts their prospects for economic recovery. In addition to work by the 
Center’s research staff, this report summarizes studies commissioned of leading 
economists that the Center is publishing in full separately.  Professor Alan B. 
Krueger of Princeton University and Jonathan Orszag of Sebago Associates 
produced a range of forecasts for Hispanic unemployment, income and 
poverty. Professor Arturo Gonzalez of the University of Arizona undertook a 
detailed analysis of the course of the recession among Latino generations. 
Professor Francisco Rivera-Batiz of Columbia University examined the special 
conditions confronting Hispanics in New York City. 
 
Other major findings: 
 
• The heaviest job losses for Latinos so far are concentrated in 
manufacturing and the retail trade, which together account for 40 
percent of all Hispanic unemployment. The second generation, Latinos 
of Mexican origins and women have been hardest hit overall. 
 
• Hispanic unemployment rates are high in the hospitality industry, 
as well as in transportation, sectors hard hit by the terrorist actions of 
   
 
9/11. However, only a small portion of the Latino workforce is employed 
in these industries. 
 
• California and New York, home to about half of all Hispanic 
workers, have Latino unemployment rates that are a full percentage 
point higher than the Latino rate nationally. Job losses for Latinos in 
New York City could reach as high as 15 percent by the end of 2002. 
 
• Using the average of the Blue Chip Indicators of 50 leading 
econometric forecasts, Hispanic unemployment nationally is projected 
to hit 8.5 percent in the second quarter of 2002 before leveling off.  It 
will begin to fall again in the fourth quarter of 2002 but will not recover 
its pre-recession levels until 2004. Under less optimistic scenarios, 
Hispanic unemployment could peak at approximately 10 percent in 
2003.  That would mean some 1.5 million Latinos out of work a year 
from now compared with 927,000 a year ago. 
 
• Despite considerable economic gains in the late 1990s, the bulk of 
the Latino population has few resources to weather the recession. On 
average, household savings and other assets are minimal.  
 
• Access to public safety-net programs such as unemployment 
insurance and food stamps are limited by labor conditions and eligibility 
requirements. Out of 1.26 million unemployed Latinos in December 
2001, only 40 percent are likely to be receiving UI benefits, leaving some 
756,000 in the cold.  
 
During the late 1990s Latino communities scored impressive economic 
gains even as they absorbed a steady stream of new, low-skilled immigrants. 
Like the U.S. economy as a whole, the long-term prospects for Latinos are good, 
but a prolonged period of recession and recovery could prove costly. Large 
numbers of young people and recent immigrants are still establishing their 
place in the workforce and in society. The prolonged effects of this recession 
potentially will make that process much more difficult. And the downturn 
threatens to stall the economic progress marked by the growing Latino middle 
class.  
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The number of Latino-owned 
businesses grew by 30% from 
1992 to 1997 versus 7% for 
businesses overall. 
I. RIDING THE RISING TIDE OF THE NEW ECONOMY 
 
From March 1991 to March 2001, the United States experienced the longest 
economic expansion in its history. Nationally, the rate of unemployment 
dropped below four percent and tight labor markets created job opportunities 
for workers at all skill levels. As a result, the overall poverty rate fell to 11.3 
percent in 2000, a low that had not been tested since 1974. Latinos participated 
in these gains belatedly, having taken longer than any other racial or ethnic 
group to recover from the 1990-91 recession. But in the final years of the 
expansion Latinos experienced rapid economic advances. The decade of 
expansion coincided with a period of rapid demographic change, most notably 
a 58 percent jump in the size of the Hispanic population. Though Latinos are 
still concentrated near the bottom of the economic ladder, that bottom is 
higher than it has been in decades. 
From 1995 to 2000 median family income for Latinos rose by 27 percent in 
real terms, compared with 11 percent for all families. And it was the poorest 
Latinos who experienced the largest gains. Families in the bottom fifth of 
Hispanic population in terms of annual income experienced a 32 percent boost, 
while those in the top quintile of Hispanics saw only a 15 percent increase in 
their income. As a result of these gains at the bottom, Hispanic poverty rates 
fell by approximately one-third, from 30 percent in 1995 to 21 percent in 2000. 
During this uninterrupted stretch of economic growth, millions of new 
immigrants got through the 
difficult initial phase of 
assimilation, advancing beyond 
entry-level jobs and learning how 
to get along in an American 
workplace. Many others, 
especially among the native born 
and the better educated, made it to the middle class, buying homes and 
establishing small businesses. Hispanic households with earnings of more than 
$40,000 increased by about one-quarter during the boom decade compared 
with a rise of only one-seventh for non-Hispanic white households. Between 
1992 and 1997 the number of businesses owned by Latinos increased by 30 
percent, compared with 7 percent for businesses overall. Revenue for Latino 
businesses also grew faster than the norm. Most of these firms were small 
businesses and many employed other Hispanics so that their successes had a 
multiplier effect in Latino communities. 
Rapid population growth and sustained economic advances during the past 
decade transformed Latinos’ place in American society. One can see the change 
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by contrasting the economic 
situation for Hispanics at the 
beginning of the economic 
expansion and at the end. In 
March 1991 the Hispanic labor 
force numbered 10.7 million 
and experienced a 9.8 percent 
unemployment rate. In March 
2001 the rate was 6.2 percent 
and the Latino workforce had 
grown by 47 percent to 15.7 
million. And during that decade 
of growth the median family 
income for Latinos rose from 
$29,600 to $35,000 (adjusted for 
inflation).  
In short, Latinos went into 
this recession representing not 
only a bigger chunk of the American economy but also one that was in better 
shape than last time. The rise of the Hispanic middle class and a small but 
growing professional class has generated new political clout. Pocketbook issues 
for Latino voters now go beyond the concerns of low-wage workers to also 
encompass the worries of shop owners, construction contractors, accountants, 
plant foremen and entrepreneurs.  
        
Vulnerabilities Amid the Gains 
The success stories of the 1990s mask other historical realities that could 
alter Hispanic fates in the current recession: Latinos as a whole were very slow 
to recover from the 1990-91 recession, and most of their economic gains were 
scored only during the last few years of the expansion. Despite the notable 
advances, many Latinos remain concentrated in jobs vulnerable to layoffs and 
many lack the skills, education and financial resources that can make a 
recession easier to weather. 
Following the recession that officially ended in spring 1991, it took until 
1994 for African Americans to get back to their pre-recession economic status as 
measured by the unemployment rate and median family income. For Latinos, 
the recovery period was three years longer. The recession that officially lasted 
just eight months at the national level stretched out into seven years of losses, 
then stagnation, then finally progress forward for millions of Latino 
households. Several of the factors that caused the slow Hispanic recovery in the 
 - 3 -  
 
Hispanic workers are heavily 
concentrated in sectors of the 
economy that have been especially 
hard hit, such as the retail trade and 
manufacturing.  This is not simply a 
function of low skills.
mid-1990s are still in play, according to recent studies conducted for the Pew 
Hispanic Center and research done after the 1990-91 recession. 
“Assessments of job losses during the recent recession [1990-91] 
consistently show that Hispanics were the biggest losers,” wrote Johanne 
Boisjoly and Greg J. Duncan in a 1994 report published by the Labor 
Department, and the key factors they identified as leading to those losses are 
still present today. Then and now the likelihood of being out of a job is closely 
tied to a worker’s education, language skills and experience in the U.S. labor 
market. Then and now Hispanic workers are likely to be younger than non-
Hispanics, to be recent immigrants, to have less education, to fill less-skilled 
jobs and to work in industries that typically experience large labor reductions 
in a downturn. 
Today, over half of the difference between the unemployment rates of 
Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites is tied to differences in education. One 
third of the Hispanic labor force has less than a high school education, and the 
rate of unemployment for such workers is nearly three times as high as that of 
Hispanic college graduates. Even among those who are employed, a sizable 
number of Latinos are barely making it. In 1999, for example, 10.7 percent of 
Hispanics who had been in the labor force for 27 weeks of the year or more 
lived below the official poverty level compared with 4.3 percent of the white 
labor force. These characteristics mean not only that large numbers of Latinos 
get hit early and hard during a recession but also that they lack the tools to 
readily change occupations when a rebounding economy creates opportunities. 
 Aside from their characteristics, Latinos are experiencing significant job 
losses in this recession because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
Hispanic workers are heavily concentrated in sectors of the economy that have 
been especially hard hit, such as retail trade and manufacturing.  This is not 
simply a function of low skills. The over-representation of Latinos in certain 
industries is also a function 
of the jobs available in the 
localities where they settle, 
hiring networks, and their 
replacement of other groups 
who move onto different 
kinds of work. For example, 
manufacturing has been in a 
slow decline for at least three decades, and over that period the share of whites 
working in manufacturing has dropped while the Latino share has increased.  
Moreover, Latinos are highly interdependent. Hispanic-owned businesses 
are concentrated in Hispanic communities and often count on other Latinos 
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both as employees and customers. During good times this can spread and even 
intensify economic benefits when money is recycled within a community. But 
this “greenhouse” or “enclave” effect can work the other way during a 
downturn, multiplying the pains and cascading losses through an entire 
community.  
Rapid population growth due to immigration and high birth rates further 
complicate the economic picture for Latinos. About one-quarter of the Hispanic 
population is 15 to 30 years old. More than one-sixth of the Hispanic 
population is made up of immigrants who arrived in the past decade. So, even 
as more established and better educated Latinos move up into the middle class, 
the Hispanic workforce is constantly growing through the addition of young 
people and recent immigrants who usually have to start at the bottom.  
Many Latinos are indeed fulfilling the American dream by working their 
way up the economic ladder, but every day a new and larger group of Hispanics 
start to fill their places on the bottom rungs. In fact, throughout the 1990s the 
lower-income Hispanic population grew faster than the middle class. As a 
result, on the eve of the current recession, about one third of all Latino 
households had less than $20,000 in income per year, roughly equal to the 
share of households with middle-class earnings of $40,000 per year or more.  
Low-income workers are more susceptible to layoffs in a downturn and are less 
able to adjust their career tracks to find new jobs. They are less likely to have 
health insurance and are more reliant on public safety-net programs such as 
food stamps. Among Hispanics, low-end workers face the added difficulties of 
often being new to the labor force and of lacking access to the safety net 
because of their immigration status. 
Among the achievers in Latino communities, there is another distinct, and 
somewhat poignant, economic vulnerability. As noted, many of the economic 
gains are fairly recent and as a result they are potentially fragile. Millions of 
Latinos bought homes, started new businesses or moved up to better jobs 
during the final years of the expansion. These Latinos bet their stake on the 
belief that the good days would keep on coming. Now, many face the prospect 
of being caught short.   
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II. THE RECESSION THUS FAR  
 
 Latinos have not fared well in past recessions compared with some other 
segments of the U.S. population but they have done better than others. That 
pattern seems to be holding in the current downturn. On average over the past 
three decades the Hispanic unemployment rate has been 4 points higher than 
the rate for non-Hispanic whites. During recessions, the gap has widened. 
During expansions, the gap has narrowed, though it has never fully closed. In 
1999 the spread in the unemployment rate narrowed to 3 points and then 2 
points in 2000. Over the course of 2001 the gap broadened and by December it 
had reached 2.8 points. The inverse is true relative to black unemployment. 
Hispanics consistently show lower unemployment rates, and the gap between 
the two widens in recessions.  
The current recession officially began in March 2001. By December 2001, 
nine months into the downturn, the Hispanic unemployment rate had reached 
7.8 percent, which translated into 1,260,000 people out of work. That marked 
an increase of 281,000 in the number of Latino unemployed compared with 
March when the Latino unemployment rate stood at 6.2 percent. During the 
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s the climb in unemployment was steeper in 
the early phases, which suggests that Hispanics may be better off this time. On 
the other hand, the unemployment rate for Latinos began to go up in late 
summer 2000, and for African Americans the trend became evident by late 
autumn. Clearly, the recession began earlier for minority workers than it did for 
whites. This is largely attributable to the minority workers’ concentration in 
industries such as manufacturing which led the way into the current recession. 
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Throughout the following 
section, the discussion refers to 
data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) of U.S. 
households.  This survey is the 
federal government's major 
source of monthly information 
about the U.S. labor force. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
releases regular key CPS 
statistics and makes the survey 
data publicly available.  The 
data used in the figures are 
tabulations of the CPS made by 
the Pew Hispanic Center 
contrasting data from 
September 2000 when Latino 
unemployment began to 
increase with data from March 2001, the official start date of the recession, and 
with just released data from December 2001. 
        
The Young Second Generation Hit Hardest 
The most striking characteristic of the recession’s impact on Latinos thus 
far, and potentially the most significant in the long run, is the 
disproportionately high unemployment developing in the second generation—
those who are U.S.-born with at least one parent born abroad. This young 
population is 10 million strong but most are very young. Nearly 3 million are 
now in the labor force, and they are the products of U.S. schools, English 
speakers and familiar with American work habits. They are a big part of the 
future, not only for Latino communities but also for the nation as a whole. 
As the baby-boom generation ages out of the workforce over the next two 
decades, the Latino second generation will be the fastest-growing source of new 
native-born workers available to fill its shoes. This is the first recession since the 
children of the big Latino immigrant waves of the 1980s began entering the 
labor market. And, so far, they are getting hit hard.  
Research conducted for the Pew Hispanic Center by Arturo Gonzalez, an 
economist at the University of Arizona, found that since Latino unemployment 
began to climb in late 2000, the second generation has suffered higher rates of 
joblessness than either Hispanic immigrants—the foreign-born first 
generation—or later generations of native-born Latinos. By last December, 
 - 7 -  
 
Unemployment Highest for Second 
Generation
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Mexican Origin Other Hispanic
September 2000 March 2001 December 2001
unemployment among second-
generation Latinos was solidly 
above 9 percent and at other 
points during the recession 
buildup it has spiked up to 10 
percent. 
While the greatest numbers 
of newly unemployed 
immigrants are in low-skilled 
occupations, the losses in the 
second generation are more 
evenly spread out to include 
sizeable shares of professionals, 
managers, technicians and 
administrators. Unemployment 
among second-generation 
Latinos in these more skilled 
occupations is higher than for 
non-Hispanics holding similar jobs. The most likely explanation for the greater 
job losses among second-generation workers is their youth. Lacking seniority, 
younger workers typically are hurt badly in recessions, especially in the early 
rounds of layoffs. Hispanic immigrants in 2001 averaged about 37 years of age, 
while second-generation Latinos averaged only 19 years. Third-generation 
Hispanics—persons born in the United States to two U.S.-born parents—were a 
little older at 26 years on average. But it is unlikely that age alone can explain 
the degree of second-generation unemployment. 
In part, the second generation may be suffering more because it is better 
integrated into the economy than its immigrant parents’ generation. Native-
born Latinos are more likely to work in larger firms and in more formal 
industries. Switching to other jobs or simply reducing the number of hours 
worked is more difficult for them. This contrast is evident in Gonzalez’s 
analysis of data on the strategies the unemployed are using to find work. 
Immigrant Latinos tend to rely more on friends and relatives, or they contact 
employers directly. Rather than turning to social networks or simply hitting the 
streets, second-generation Latinos tend to use more formal job-search methods 
such as sending resumes to prospective employers or filling out job 
applications. 
The higher rates of unemployment for the Latino second generation are 
puzzling because immigrants might be expected to suffer most in a recession. 
They have poorer levels of education than the native-born, have fewer English 
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Women
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skills, and are still learning the ropes in the U.S. labor market. Indeed, in the 
1990-91 recession, Latino immigrants did experience more job losses than the 
native-born.  But then during the decade-long expansion it was the immigrants 
who fared best. The decline in the Hispanic unemployment rate during the 
New Economy of the late 1990s was disproportionately concentrated among 
foreign-born Hispanics. In 1996, the unemployment rates of native-born and 
foreign-born Hispanics were roughly equal: 9.0 percent and 8.9 percent 
respectively. By 2000, the native-born Hispanic unemployment rate had fallen 
to 6.4 percent, while the foreign-born Hispanic unemployment rate dropped to 
5.1 percent.  
 
Mexicans and Women Fare Poorly Thus Far  
Unemployment rates for all major Hispanic national origin groups fell 
about 40 percent during the latter half of the 1990s. Those of Mexican origin 
experienced a decline from 9.7 to 5.9 percent, those of Puerto Rican descent 
from 11.2 to 6.4 percent, and the lowest unemployment figures are found 
among Cuban Americans, whose unemployment rate dropped from 7.4 percent 
in 1995 to 4.4 in 2000. In the early stages of the downturn in autumn 2001, 
increasing unemployment appeared more or less evenly distributed among the 
national sub-groups, but as the recession has gathered force, Latinos of Mexican 
origin have had a high level of job loss. In December 2001 the unemployment 
rate among Hispanics of Mexican descent was 7.9 percent, while among all 
other Latinos it was 7.3 
percent.  
The recession is taking a 
notable toll among female 
Hispanic workers, who are 
experiencing a higher 
unemployment rate than 
Latino males. In December 
2001 women of Mexican 
descent had an unemployment 
rate of 8.9 percent compared 
with 7.2 percent for Mexican 
males. Among all other 
Hispanic sub-groups the 
breakdown on gender was 7.8 
percent for women versus 6.8 
percent for men. This gender 
differential does not show up 
 - 9 -  
 
Hispanic Unemployment Rates Highest in 
Low Skilled Occupations
0% 5% 10%
Executive, Admin, &
Managerial Occs
Professional Specialty
Occs
Technicians And Related
Support Occs
Sales Occs
Admin. Support Occs,
Incl. Clerical
Private Household Occs
Protective Serv ice Occs
Serv ice Occs, Exc.
Protective & Hhld
Precision Prod., Craft &
Repair Occs
Machine Opers,
Assemblers & Inspectors
Transportation And
Material Moving Occs
Handlers,equip
Cleaners,helpers,laborers
in the statistics for either non-Hispanic whites or African Americans. Males had 
higher unemployment in both these groups in November. The concentration of 
Hispanic women in the most vulnerable low-skilled and part-time jobs has 
made them front-line 
casualties in this 
recession. 
 
Low Skills 
Mean High 
Unemployment 
Examining 
Latino job losses 
according to 
occupations shows, 
not surprisingly, that 
workers with low 
skills have been most 
affected. This is both 
because Hispanic 
workers are 
concentrated in these 
occupations and 
because that is where 
the new recession hit 
first. Latino 
unemployment is 
particularly high at 
this time among 
handlers, equipment 
cleaners, helpers and 
laborers. About one-
fifth of the workers in 
these low-skilled 
occupations are 
Latinos. 
Unemployment is 
also high for 
Hispanics in transportation and material-moving occupations. At the other 
extreme, Latino unemployment is at 3.3 percent of workers in executive, 
administrative, and managerial occupations but there are relatively few 
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Hispanics in these jobs. Unemployment in farming tends to be high at any 
time. The December 
2001 rate of 13 
percent is not 
unusual.  
 
By Industry, a 
Tightly Focused 
Recession 
Looking at the 
breakdown of 
unemployment data 
by industry reveals a 
recession that is 
producing large and 
disproportionate job 
losses for Latinos in a 
few important sectors 
of the economy. The 
manufacturing sector 
alone has produced 
nearly one-fifth of all 
unemployed 
Hispanics— some 
200,000 workers 
without jobs in 
December—although 
manufacturing 
accounted for only 
one-tenth of the 
nation’s 
unemployment. The 
job losses in 
manufacturing are 
part of a broad 
decline in the entire 
sector, but as factories 
and packing plants 
have cut their 
workforce, Latinos have been hit harder than other groups.  
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While Hispanics are just 13 percent of the nation’s manufacturing workers, 
they make up a much larger share—18 percent— of the manufacturing workers 
who have lost their jobs. Several factors appear to be at play. First is their 
concentration in nondurable goods manufacturing, where layoffs begin at the 
first sign of slackening demand. Unemployment claims from food processing 
doubled between September and November last year, and in the production of 
small rubber and plastic products, the layoffs multiplied sevenfold. 
Beyond manufacturing, another fifth of the Latino unemployed are found 
in retail trade. Together with construction, these three sectors account for one 
half of Hispanic unemployment in December 2001. 
African American workers went into this recession with an unemployment 
rate about 2 points higher than Hispanics and, on average, that spread has 
remained the same as joblessness for both groups has increased. As is the case 
with Hispanics, a large share, 27 percent, of black unemployment comes out of 
the retail trade. By contrast, though, African American job losses are higher in 
construction and repair services.  
 
Bad in NYC, Not So Bad in LA 
       Most Hispanics work and live in just a few states, with half working in 
California and Texas and almost another fifth working in Florida, New York 
and Illinois. The rate of unemployment in these states is well above the 
national average. In December 2001, Hispanics in California, New York and 
Florida faced unemployment rates of just over 8 percent, and those in Texas 
and Illinois of about 6 percent.  
During the recession of the early 1990s, which had Los Angeles as its 
epicenter, unemployment for Hispanics in California peaked at more than 13 
percent. Today, California’s economy is stronger, particularly in the south 
where the Latino population is largest. Hispanic unemployment in Los Angeles 
is not quite 7 percent, although it is just over 
9 percent in San Francisco.  
Overall, the Latino population of New 
York City did not enjoy much of an economic 
bounce during the years of economic growth 
in the 1990s. This is due at least in part to a 
wave of demographic change that saw a rapid 
influx of Latino immigrants from the 
Dominican Republic, Mexico and South 
America and a substantial out-migration of 
Puerto Ricans. A study conducted for the Pew 
Hispanic Center by Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, 
High levels of poverty 
and stagnant income 
among Hispanic New 
Yorkers are just two 
warning signs that 
New York Hispanics 
could face greater 
hardships than Latinos 
elsewhere during the 
current recession and 
its aftermath. 
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an economist at Columbia University, shows that Latino poverty rates were the 
same, about 30 percent, at the end of the 1990s as they were at the beginning 
of the decade. In addition, Latino per capita income increased only slightly 
during this period while it rose forcefully for non-Hispanic whites in the city.  
High levels of poverty and stagnant income among Hispanic New Yorkers 
are just two warning signs that New York Hispanics could face greater hardships 
than Latinos elsewhere during the current recession and its aftermath. Hispanic 
unemployment has already reached 7.9 percent in the New York metropolitan 
area, twice the rate for non-Hispanic whites and just less than the black jobless 
rate. Rivera-Batiz estimates that Latino unemployment in New York is likely to 
rise to between 12.8 and 15.2 percent by the end of 2002. Rivera-Batiz argues 
that the new, heavily immigrant Hispanic population of New York faces a 
substantial competitive disadvantage in the city’s labor market because 
education and work experience generate higher economic returns there than in 
most of the rest of the country. 
        
Looking for the 9/11 Effect 
Massive layoffs in the hotel industry since September 11 have been widely 
publicized, but thus far it appears that the economic after-effects of the terrorist 
attack have been considerably localized for Hispanics. Currently, Hispanics 
make up about 11 percent of the total civilian workforce but account for 21 
percent of the 1.4 million Americans employed in the hotel and motel 
industry. Inevitably they have taken a large share of the losses. 
Unemployment of Latinos working in entertainment and recreation 
services is running at 11.5 percent, higher than in any other sector of the 
economy. In addition, some of the losses in the retail sector, which includes 
restaurant workers, are attributable to the drop in travel and entertainment 
following the September events. The impact of historically low hotel occupancy 
rates has been catastrophic in cities like Las Vegas, Miami and San Francisco, 
where tourism is an important source of employment for many Latinos.  
However, on a national scale the impact on Latinos has been much smaller. 
Jobless Hispanics from the entertainment and recreation sector account for less 
than three percent of overall Hispanic unemployment. In December 2001, 
there were 32,000 Latinos unemployed in that sector compared with 138,000 in 
construction.  
 
III. FORECASTING UNEMPLOYMENT, INCOME AND POVERTY 
 
Predicting how Latinos will fare in the current recession is necessarily a 
hazardous exercise. Economic forecasting has limitations in the most of 
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ordinary times. Now there is additional uncertainty stemming from the 
September 11 attack and its aftermath. Still, there are a variety of forecasting 
tools based both on current conditions and historical data that can be used to 
produce a range of estimates for the future course of the economy. In addition, 
there is a considerable body of research on the relationship between labor 
market indicators and the condition of the economy. As a result, it is possible 
to utilize historical experience and well-tested theories on the functioning of 
the American economy to construct models that show how a specific indicator, 
such as Hispanic unemployment, is likely to change in relationship to a 
macroeconomic indicator, such as overall unemployment.  
The Pew Hispanic Center commissioned Alan B. Krueger, the Bendheim 
professor of economics and public policy at Princeton University, and Jonathan 
M. Orszag, the managing director of Sebago Associates Inc., an economics and 
public policy consulting firm, to develop forecasts of key indicators of Hispanic 
economic well-being, including unemployment, family income and poverty. 
Using two different methodologies and several different assumptions about the 
economy’s future course, Krueger and Orszag produced a total of 22 different 
projections. A review of their work as a whole offers a clear sense of the range of 
possible outcomes. 
Given that Latinos work at every stratum of the labor force and in many 
different occupations, no forecasts can apply to the entire Hispanic population, 
but for the majority of Latino households that are low-to middle-income, the 
prospects are troubling. Elevated unemployment rates usually persist after a 
recession has officially ended, and the resultant losses in income often take 
even longer to recover. The effects of this recession, however, are likely to be 
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felt in Latino households for an especially prolonged period of time. Even if the 
economy rebounds this summer, as some optimistic but disputed forecasts 
suggest, Latino family income and poverty rates are not likely to get back to 
pre-recession levels until late in 2004. If the recession lasts longer or the 
recovery is slow and staggering, as other forecasts suggest, these key indicators 
of well being for Hispanics are not expected to bounce back until well into 
2005 or beyond. 
The after-effects of the recession could mean that millions of Latino 
working-class families, which had experienced steadily improving 
circumstances since the mid-1990s, will face four years of diminished incomes. 
For many others closer to the bottom of the economic ladder, these forecasts 
portend a year or two of real crisis followed by a prolonged and difficult 
struggle. As Harry P. Pachon, president of the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute put 
it, “Four years is a long time in the life of a family. It is an entire high school 
career. The difference will be between feeling optimistic and seeing things 
getting better and just scraping by and worrying all the time about where life is 
headed.” 
In their co-authored study, Krueger and Orszag used two approaches to 
forecast future economic trends for the Hispanic population. The first used 50 
independent forecasts of national unemployment as reported by the Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators, a newsletter that surveys private-sector economists.  
Using an average of these forecasts, the Hispanic unemployment rate is 
expected to peak at 8.5 percent in the second quarter of this year before 
leveling out. The Hispanic unemployment rate then begins to fall again in the 
fourth quarter of 2002.  
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Utilizing an average of the 10 most pessimistic Blue Chip forecasts, 
Hispanic unemployment could rise to 9.3 percent in the second quarter of 2002 
before falling to 9.2 percent in the fourth quarter. This would mean that nearly 
700,000 more Hispanics would be unemployed at the height of the recession 
than in autumn 2000, when Latino unemployment began to rise. Finally, based 
on an average of the 10 most optimistic Blue Chip forecasts, Hispanic 
unemployment would rise to 8.0 percent in the first quarter of 2002, then 
would start to drop in the third and fourth quarters to end the year at 7.5 
percent. Under each of these three scenarios, however, Hispanic 
unemployment does not return to pre-recession lows until 2004.   
The Blue Chip forecasts all fit within a fairly narrow range of scenarios that 
foresee the national economy recovering robustly in the middle of this year. 
Some top economists and business leaders have characterized this outlook as 
excessively optimistic in recent weeks. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, for example, has added his voice to those dampening expectations 
that the recession is almost over. “The long-run picture remains bright,” 
Greenspan said in a San Francisco speech on January 11. “But I would 
emphasize that we continue to face significant risks in the near term, he said.” 
Among the risks he cited was that “the unemployment rate may continue to 
rise for a while.” 
Partially to address concerns that the Blue Chip forecasts may be too 
optimistic, Krueger and Orszag used a second approach that relies on the 
historical record from the past three recessions to project how Hispanics will 
fare in the current downturn. The weakness in this forecasting tool stems from 
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the differing characters of each recession as well as the constant change both in 
the economy and in the Hispanic population.  
If the current downturn mimics the path of the most recent recession, and 
perhaps the most comparable one, that of the early 1990s, Hispanic 
unemployment would rise to 9 percent by the end of 2002 and then to 10 
percent in late 2003. In this scenario, Hispanic unemployment would not 
return to pre-recession levels until March 2008, while white and African 
American unemployment rates would return to roughly their pre-recession 
levels by early 2006. 
        
Family Income and Poverty Rates Slow to Recover 
Using the same approaches they applied to Latino unemployment, Krueger 
and Orszag developed forecasts for Hispanic family income and poverty rates. 
Even under the most optimistic of the Blue Chip forecasts, Hispanic family 
income would continue to fall through 2002 and would not regain its pre-
recession levels until 2004.  If the current recession follows the path of the 
1990-91 downturn, median Hispanic family income would not fully recover 
until 2010.  
Hispanic poverty, while significantly improved during the 1990s, remains 
twice as high as the overall poverty rate, and it is closely tied to employment. 
For each percentage point rise in the national unemployment rate, Hispanic 
poverty increases by an average of 1.2 percentage points. Using the average of 
the Blue Chip forecasts, Hispanic poverty is expected to rise from 21.2 percent 
in 2000 to 23.2 percent in 2002 and would remain slightly above its pre-
recession levels through 2004. Forecasts based on past recessions similarly 
suggest rising poverty this year and a long slow recovery that stretches to 2004 
or beyond.  
A variety of factors may help explain why the Latino population seems 
poised for a prolonged period of economic struggle. These include: Youth, low 
levels of education and skills, substantial numbers of immigrants, heavy 
concentration in industries and occupations that commonly experience 
cutbacks in the labor force during times of economic uncertainty. Moreover, 
large populations of Latinos live in a few cities where their own influx has been 
the major source of population growth for the past two decades. Finally, there 
is a heavy reliance on social networks to find jobs, especially among 
immigrants, and so it is not uncommon to find an entire extended family 
working for the same employer. These are some of the dominant characteristics 
of the Hispanic workforce. In different ways each of these factors made Latino 
workers an effective component of the economic expansion that lasted for a 
decade. As such these characteristics contributed to Latino economic successes 
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Net Worth, Financial Assets, Liquid Assets, and 
Savings Among Hispanic Families, 1998
All Families Hispanics Overall
Median Net Worth $9,720 $71,700
Mean Net Worth $86,895 $282,980
Median Financial Assets $1,200 $17,320
Mean Financial Assets $32,656 $134,271
Median Liquid Assets $600 $2,500
Mean Liquid Assets $8,239 $15,242
Percent with Savings 29.5% 41.7%
in the 1990s. The same characteristics now leave them vulnerable in a 
recession. 
 
IV. RESOURCES FOR WEATHERING THE RECESSION 
 
Personal Savings 
As unemployment rises during a recession it places pressures on families to 
draw on their available financial resources. Delaying purchases, even necessary 
medical expenses, and spending hard-earned savings are the first lines of 
defense.  
 
Research conducted for the Pew Hispanic Center by Krueger and Orszag 
shows that Hispanic families’ personal assets will not buffer them much from 
prolonged spells of unemployment. Data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances found that in 1998 the median net worth of Hispanic 
families was $9,720 or one seventh that of the average U.S. family. By 
comparison, the median net worth of African American families was $15,500 in 
1998. The data also show that the typical Hispanic family had just $600 in 
liquid financial assets like checking and savings accounts. While rising incomes 
in the last few years of the economic expansion may have improved this 
situation for some Latino families, recent data suggests that very little of that 
increased income was put away for a rainy day. According to the Bureau of the 
Census, only 26 percent of Hispanics reported receiving income from savings in 
2000, compared with 55 percent of whites.  
Government safety-net programs have often softened the effects of 
recession for eligible workers and their families and have helped the economy 
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rebound by maintaining at least a minimum level of consumption among 
recipients. Of all the nation’s major racial and ethnic groups, Hispanics appear 
likely to benefit the least from these programs during the current recession.  
 
Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides eligible workers support when they 
have been laid off due to no fault of their own and are able, available and 
looking for work. Each state’s benefits are different, but UI generally replaces 40 
to 50 percent of previous wages for up to 26 weeks. Yet only about 40 percent 
of all unemployed workers receive UI benefits and that figure is considered high 
for the Hispanic workforce. Most workers are ineligible for UI because they seek 
only part-time work or because their work histories do not satisfy the programs 
requirements. In December 2001 there were 1.26 million unemployed Latinos, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). If 40 percent received UI 
benefits, some 756,000 went without. 
 
Food Stamps 
In March 2001, 17.3 million people, mostly children, benefited from food 
stamps. The maximum permissible benefit for a family of four is $434 per 
month while the average benefit was less than $75 per person per month. The 
preponderance of applications for food stamps is due to a sharp drop in 
earnings, the loss of the primary wage earner, or the head of household had 
exhausted the 26 week maximum for unemployment insurance. 
       During past recessions food stamps have provided a critical sustenance 
to many Latinos who found themselves out of work. However, the share of the 
Hispanic population eligible for food stamps in this downturn is much smaller. 
The 1996 welfare reform law made most legal immigrants who have not 
acquired U.S. citizenship ineligible for food stamps (unauthorized migrants 
were always ineligible), and it imposed elaborate new application procedures 
for those who do qualify.  The number of non-citizens eligible for food stamps 
dropped by 41 percent as a result of welfare reform, according to a Department 
of Agriculture study. In 1996, 4.7 million Latinos received food stamps. By 2000 
improved economic status and the effects of welfare reform had brought the 
number down to 3.1 million Latinos, less than one-fifth of the total 
participants according to the Agriculture Department.  
 
 
 
Health Insurance 
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Two in five Hispanics of working age do not have any health care 
insurance even when they are fully employed. Among all workers who get 
health care coverage through their jobs, about 30 to 40 percent lose their 
insurance when they lose their jobs, according to a recent report by the 
Commonwealth Fund.  Most workers can “buy back” into their health care 
plans by making payments under the COBRA program, but relatively few do—
about one-fifth—because of the high cost of the premiums. Latinos are less 
likely than workers of other racial and ethnic groups to have COBRA coverage. 
Under federal law workers at firms with fewer than 20 employees are not 
eligible for COBRA, and Latinos are disproportionately overrepresented in such 
firms. 
         
V. CONCLUSIONS: AFTERSHOCKS OF RECESSION 
 
Having gone into this recession in better overall economic shape than ever 
before, Hispanic workers may 
suffer less than they have in 
past downturns.  But 
unemployment losses have 
been heavy and Hispanics are 
still in for a prolonged period of 
losses as this recession runs its 
course.  For Hispanics this 
downturn is already about 15 
months old, given that their 
unemployment rate started to tick up in September 2000, a full six months 
before the official start date of the recession. And, even under the most 
optimistic scenarios, it will take Latinos until 2004 to fully recover, leaving 
them lagging behind the economic upswing by up to a year or more. 
As with the U.S. economy as a whole, the long-term prospects for Latinos 
are good. But, this four-year period of recession and recovery could prove a 
costly economic detour for the Hispanic population given its particular 
characteristics. Large numbers of young people and recent immigrants are still 
establishing their place in the workforce and in society. The prolonged effects 
of this recession potentially will complicate that process. The downturn also 
threatens to stall the economic progress marked by the growing Latino middle 
class.  
The last years of the 1990s expansion produced notable benefits for both of 
these broad swaths of the Latino population—those who are just getting started 
and those who were well-established and moving ahead. The unskilled might 
As with the U.S. economy as a 
whole, the long-term prospects for 
Latinos are good. But, this four-year 
period of recession and recovery 
could prove a costly economic 
detour for the Hispanic population 
given its particular characteristics. 
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only earn poverty wages, but jobs were so plentiful that they did not have to 
worry about going unemployed. Latino voters were making themselves felt in 
U.S. politics. And, Latino popular culture had penetrated the mainstream 
market enough to make Hispanics and Hispanic ways a much more familiar 
aspect of the American landscape for many whites and African Americans. 
Finally, 2000 census counts released last spring quantified extraordinary 
demographic growth and gave formal recognition to the Latino population’s 
place as a large and permanent member of the American family. 
The recession and the long recovery will not neutralize all of this forward 
momentum, but it will be slowed. Whether this will be a drastic redirection for 
the Latino population depends on many factors not the least of which are the 
length of the recession and the pace of the recovery. Also, several policy 
proposals put forth by both Democrats and Republicans could mitigate some of 
the economic losses faced by Latinos by either strengthening safety net 
programs or stimulating renewed economic growth. Regardless of how these 
factors play out, the new recession has already closed one chapter in the Latino 
story—the exuberant economic gains and the ready jobs of the late 1990s.  The 
beginning of the next chapter is being written in this recession.  
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